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I. The Bankruptcy Trustee’s Power of Turnover 
A. The Trustee has a Broad Reach to Turnover Assets 
Under section 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, “an entity, other than a custodian, in 
possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease 
. . . shall deliver to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property . . . 
.”4  Section 542(a) is limited in that turnover is not required when the property is of 
inconsequential value or benefit to the estate, when the holder of the property has transferred it in 
good faith without knowledge of the bankruptcy petition, or when the transfer of the property is 
automatic to pay a life insurance premium.5  However, of these limitations, “none requires that 
the debtor hold a possessory interest in the property at the commencement of the reorganization 
proceedings.”6 
The property that is subject to turnover is not defined in section 542, but it is commonly 
understood to mean “property of the estate,” as defined in section 541.7  Section 541 of the 
Bankruptcy Code defines “property of the estate” as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor 
in property as of the commencement of the case,” with few exceptions.8 Further, §541(a)(6) 
states that “proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits from services performed by Debtors 
prior to the commencement of their bankruptcy case are property of the estate.”9  The Supreme 
Court affirmed the expansive nature of § 541(a) in United States v. Whiting Pools: “[t]he House 
and Senate Reports on the Bankruptcy Code indicate that §541(a)’s scope is broad” and 
 
4 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). 
5 Id. 
6 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 206 (1983). 
7 See Brown v. Pyatt (In re Pyatt), 486 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 2007); Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 
F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006); Affiliated Computer Sys. Inc. v. Sherman (In re Kemp), 52 F.3d 546, 550 (5th 
Cir. 1995). 
8 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).  
9 See Anderson v. Win Realty, LLP (In re Anderson), No. AP 17-08040-JMM, 2018 WL 2179174, at *3 (Bankr. D. 
Idaho May 10, 2018). 
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additionally, many Bankruptcy Code provisions, such as §542(a), “bring into the estate property 
in which the debtor did not have a possessory interest at the time the bankruptcy proceedings 
commenced.”10  Due to the interaction of these provisions, when courts are faced with disputes 
about turnover, they often must determine relevant property interests.11  
B. The Role of State Property Law when Turnover is Contested 
A debtor’s property interests are determined under state law.12  While Butner v. United 
States confirmed this fact, it also acknowledged that the federal preemption doctrine still applies 
in bankruptcy cases.13  If, for example, the Bankruptcy Code provides for a rule that addresses 
the issue at hand directly, the Bankruptcy Code controls.14  
II. Circuits Courts Have Established Varying Standards When Trustees Press the 
Limits of Their Authority 
While courts must often rely on state law to determine property interests, ultimately, 
“[w]hether property is included in the bankruptcy estate is a question of law.”15  Additionally, 
Congress provided guidance on a general principle underlying § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
stating in its legislative history that § 541 was “not intended to expand the debtor’s rights against 
others more than they exist at the commencement of the case.”16  Despite this, when facing 
 
10 Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. at 205. 
11 See e.g., In re Anderson at *3; Whiting Pools, Inc., at 210-11; Weinman v. Graves (In re Graves), 609 F.3d 1153, 
1155 (10th Cir. 2010). 
12 See In re Anderson at *3 (stating that “[s]tate law generally governs property interests within the context of a 
bankruptcy case”). 
13 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (stating “[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state 
law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed 
differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding”). 
14 See Shamus Holdings, LLC v. LBM Financial, LLC (In re Shamus Holdings, LLC), 642 F.3d 263, 267 (1st Cir. 
2011) (asserting “when federal bankruptcy law supplies a rule that speaks directly to the right at issue, that rule 
controls”). 
15 See Parsons v. Union Planters Bank (In re Parsons), 280 F.3d 1185, 1188 (8th Cir. 2002).   
16 See 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868. 
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contested turnover, application of turnover standards by the circuit courts have been 
inconsistent.17   
In the Eighth Circuit, trustees can compel turnover of compensation that is earned pre-
petition and realized post-petition unless the debtor performs post-petition work that alters its 
protectable interest.18  In In re Parsons, a trustee objected to exemptions claimed by a debtor 
who argued that she was entitled to commissions paid post-petition because she rendered 
services post-petition that were “indispensable” to the closing of the contracts.19  The Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the trustee’s right to turnover of the commissions, allowing the debtor only an 
exemption of 9.7% of the commissions for her post-petition work – an amount that the court 
deemed equal to the wages she earned in post-petition work.20  The Eighth Circuit rejected the 
debtor’s argument that the commissions were exempt under § 541(a)(6), reasoning that the 
debtor’s post-petition work did not alter the existing contract terms and, therefore, also failed to 
alter her protectable interest in the commissions.21  
The Tenth Circuit will not compel turnover if doing so would grant the trustee a broader 
interest in the property than the existing interest of the debtor.22  In In re Graves, the Tenth 
Circuit stated that the trustee’s interest “must be limited to the same extent as the debtors’ 
 
17 Compare Tidewater Finance v. Moffet (In re Moffett), 356 F.3d 518, 519–20 (4th Cir. 2004) (relying on 
Virginia’s version of the UCC to determine that a secured creditor was subject to the turnover provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code and was compelled to turnover a repossessed vehicle), with Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc. v. Lewis 
(In re Lewis), 137 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (disregarding Alabama’s version of the UCC and holding that 
the “mere existence of the estate’s ability to redeem the automobile” was insufficient to render the secured creditor 
subject to turnover provisions). 
18 See In re Parsons, 280 F.3d at 1189. 
19 Id. at 1187. The facts of this case are like those of In re Anderson, with a real estate agent debtor’s commissions at 
stake in both.  Here, as in In re Anderson, the debtor also had to pay a cut of her commission to the real estate group 
she worked for, but the trustee here was less ambitious and did not even attempt to claim that part of the commission 
as property of the estate. See In re Parsons, 280 F.3d at 1188; In re Anderson, No. AP 17-08040-JMM, 2018 WL 
2179174, at *1 (Bankr. D. Idaho May 10, 2018) 
20 Id. at 1189. 
21 Id.   
22 See In re Graves, 609 F.3d at 1155 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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interest.”23  In In re Graves, the debtors elected, pre-petition, to irrevocably apply their federal 
tax refund to their tax liability the following year.24  The bankruptcy trustee challenged this 
exemption and attempted to claim the refund as property of the estate.25  The court noted that the 
debtors would not have any right to cash unless they were entitled to a refund after their next tax 
return was filed.26 The court stated that § 542 could not be used to broaden the trustee’s interest, 
and therefore reasoned that the trustee’s interest in the refund would be limited by the same 
contingencies that the debtors’ interest had been.27  As a result, the trustee would only be able to 
compel turnover if part of the initial refund exceeded the debtors’ tax liability the following 
year.28   
 In the Fourth Circuit, a debtor’s mere equitable interest in property that was repossessed 
pre-petition, including a statutory right to redeem that property, is sufficient to allow a trustee to 
compel turnover of that property.29  In In re Moffet, the Fourth Circuit stated that a debtor’s right 
to redeem repossessed property was “unquestionably a ‘legal or equitable interest.’”30  The court 
reasoned that because the debtor’s reorganization plan called for her to exercise her right of 
redemption under Virginia’s version of the UCC, the creditor’s security interest was adequately 
protected, and the repossessed vehicle was subject to the turnover provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code.31  The court conceded that the debtor did not plan to make a lump sum payment of her 
outstanding debts on the vehicle, as Virginia’s UCC required, but it reasoned that § 1322(b)(2) of 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id.   
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1157. 
27 Id. at 1157-58. 
28 Id. at 1159. 
29 See In re Moffett, 356 F.3d at 522 (4th Cir. 2004). 
30 Id.   
31 Id. at 523. 
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the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to modify claims of secured creditors, and because the plan 
called for the exercise of the right to redeem, the vehicle was subject to turnover.32  
  Conversely, in the Eleventh Circuit, an estate’s statutory right to redeem repossessed 
property is not enough to subject that property to a trustee’s power to turn over assets.33  In In re 
Lewis, the debtor’s automobile was repossessed pre-petition, and, post-petition, he attempted to 
compel the creditor to turn over the vehicle to the estate.34  The Eleventh Circuit determined that 
the debtor’s statutory right to redeem his vehicle was property of the estate.35  But the Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned that the “mere existence of the estate’s ability to redeem the automobile” did 
not render the vehicle itself “property of the estate.”36  Instead, it held that to compel turnover of 
the vehicle, the trustee would have to fulfill the statutory obligations of the right of redemption 
as a debtor outside of bankruptcy would.37   
CONCLUSION 
 A trustee in bankruptcy has broad powers to recover property of the estate under § 541 
and § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy 
trustee to compel turnover, and the property subject to the turnover provision is delineated by the 
“property of the estate” description in § 541(a). It is well-settled that barring an overriding 
federal interest, property interests are defined by state law, so the applicable standards vary by 
state when turnover is contested in bankruptcy.  Despite the underlying principle that the 
Bankruptcy Code was not intended to expand a debtor’s rights more than they exist at the 
commencement of the case, some trustees still attempt to apply the turnover provisions liberally.  
 
32 Id. 
33 See In re Lewis, 137 F.3d at 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).   
34 Id. at 1281.   
35 Id. at 1284. 
36 Id.   
37 Id. 
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And even providing for varying state property laws, the circuit courts have been inconsistent in 
their applications of what property is subject to turnover, and have established differing 
standards.  
 
